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The CoolWebSearch Chronicles |
This is an article which details the variants of the browser
hijacker known as CoolWebSearch (CWS). In the last few months,
the people behind this name have succeeded in becoming (IMHO)
an even bigger nuisance than the now infamous Lop.
The difficulty of removing CWS from a user's system has grown
from slightly tricky in the first variant to virtually
impossible for the latest few. Some of the variants even used
methods of hiding and running themselves that had never been
used before in any other spyware strains.
The chronological order in which the CWS variants appeared is
detailed here, along with the approximate dates when they
appeared online. However, since the evil programmers of CWS
have released over two dozen versions of their hijacker on the
advertising market in such a short time, and are crunching out
new ones steadily practically every week, this document might
be out of date at times.
The
CWShredder tool to remove Coolwebsearch will always be up
to date and is updated as fast as possible when new variants
emerge.
Document last updated: April 17, 2004
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CWS.Datanotary |
Variant 1: CWS.Datanotary - Introduction to Destruction
Approx date first sighted:
May 27, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=8661
Symptoms: Massive IE slowdown, especially
when typing text into forms
Cleverness: 9/10
Manual removal difficulty: Very easy, if you
know where to look
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
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O19 - User stylesheet: c:\windows\my.css |
The first variant of CoolWebSearch wasn't even identified as
such. There only were several threads of users experiencing
enormous slowdowns in IE when typin messages into text boxes.
Delays of over a minute before the typed text appeared were
reported. Also some redirections to www.datanotary.com were
reported.
The solution to this problem took a while to surface, but after
a few weeks (which is pretty long) someone reported the problem
going away when going into IE Options, Accessability and
disabling the 'Use My Stylesheet' option. After that, the fake
stylesheet file could be deleted.
The hijack installed a stylesheet that used a flaw in Internet
Explorer and allowed a .css stylesheet file to execute
Javascript code. The code in the file was encrypted, and spawned
a popup off-screen that did the redirecting. However, this file
was called on almost every action taken in IE, slowing it down -
this was the most obvious when typing text.
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CWS.Bootconf |
Variant 2: CWS.Bootconf - Evolution
Approx date first sighted:
July 6, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=7821
Symptoms: Massive IE slowdown, illegible URLs
ie IE Options, redirections when mistyping URLs, startpage &
search page changed on reboot
Cleverness: 8/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL=http://%77%77%77%2e
%63%6f%6f%6c%77%77%77%73%65%61%72%63%68%2e%63%6f%6d/%7a/%62/%78%31%2e
%63%67%69?%36%35%36%33%38%37
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar=http://%77%77%77%2e%63
%6f%6f%6c%77%77%77%73%65%61%72%63%68%2e%63%6f%6d/%7a/%63/%78%31%2e
%63%67%69?%36%35%36%33%38%37
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page=http://%77%77%77%2e%
63%6f%6f%6c%77%77%77%73%65%61%72%63%68%2e%63%6f%6d/%7a/%62/%78%31%2e
%63%67%69?%36%35%36%33%38%37
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page=http://%77%77%77%2e
%63%6f%6f%6c%77%77%77%73%65%61%72%63%68%2e%63%6f%6d/%7a/%61/%78%31%2e
%63%67%69?%36%35%36%33%38%37 about:blank
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page=http://yourbookmarks.ws/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\SearchURL,(Default)=http://www.searchxp.com/search.php?qq=%s
O1 - Hosts: 1123694712 auto.search.msn.com
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [sysPnP] C:\WINNT\System32\bootconf.exe
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINNT\default.css
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After HijackThis had built-in support for decrypting the
URLS:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/b/x1.cgi?100 (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,SearchURL
= http://www.jetseeker.com/ie/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/c/x1.cgi?100
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/a/x1.cgi?100 (obfuscated)
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.searchv.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\SearchURL,(Default)
= http://www.jetseeker.com/ffeed.php?term=%s
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Local
Page = http://search.xrenoder.com
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page_bak = http://search.xrenoder.com
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The second variant seemed like the first one in only one way: it
used the exact same .css stylesheet file. But it took the hijack
one step further by not only changing the IE startpage and
search pages, but changing them to illegible hexcode garbage.
Only when this code was decyphered it became clear that
CoolWebSearch was behind this all. It almost seemed as if they
let Datanotary take the stylesheet exploit hijack for a test
ride, before using it themselves.
The hijack further involved redirecting the default 'server not
found' page to the CoolWebSearch portal homepage by editing the
Hosts file, and reloading the entire hijack when the machine was
rebooted using a bootconf.exe file that was started with
Windows. We also started to see some pages which seemed
affiliates of CWS since almost all their links led to
www.coolwebsearch.com.
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CWS.Oslogo |
Variant 3: CWS.OSLogo.bmp - Send in the affiliates
Approx date first sighted:
July 10, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=8210
Symptoms: Massive IE slowdowns
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/b/x1.cgi?656387
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.allhyperlinks.com/ redir?lang={S...201058341631385
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/a/ x1.cgi?656387
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/b/ x1.cgi?656387
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/ redir?lang={S...201058341631385
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/ redir?lang={S...201058341631385
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://stopxxxpics.com
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/ redir?lang={S...201058341631385
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/ redir?lang={S...201058341631385
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/ redir?lang={S...201058341631385
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\,HomeOldSP
= http://www.coolwwwsearch.com/z/a/ x1.cgi?656387
(obfuscated)
O1 - Hosts: 1123694712 auto.search.msn.com
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [sysPnP] C:\WINNT\System32\bootconf.exe
O15 - Trusted Zone: *.coolwwwsearch.com
O15 - Trusted Zone: *.msn.com
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINDOWS\Web\oslogo.bmp |
After HijackThis was updated for a few tricks CWS used, a new
variant surfaced that showed CWS was just getting started. The
filename of the user stylesheet changed into one that didn't
even look like a stylesheet on the outside, but got accepted by
IE anyway. Two domains were added to the Trusted Zone to ensure
CWS could do its dirty work and install any updates if they ever
became available.
But most of all, IE start and search pages started getting
changed to several dozen different sites that were all
affiliated to CWS. There didn't seem to be an end to the flow of
different domains users were hijacked to. When I write this,
over 80 domains are known CWS affiliates - and all appeared in
users' logs.
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CWS.Msspi |
Variant 4: CWS.Msspi - Let's get dangerous
Approx date first sighted:
July 28, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=9170
Symptoms: Popups with 'enhanced results' when
doing searches on Google, Yahoo and Altavista
Cleverness: 9/10
Manual removal difficulty: Impossible, I kid
you not
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
O10 - Unknown file in Winsock LSP: c:\windows\system32\msspi.dll
O10 - Unknown file in Winsock LSP: c:\windows\system32\msspi.dll
O10 - Unknown file in Winsock LSP: c:\windows\system32\msspi.dll
O10 - Unknown file in Winsock LSP: c:\windows\system32\msspi.dll
O10 - Unknown file in Winsock LSP: c:\windows\system32\msspi.dll
O10 - Unknown file in Winsock LSP: c:\windows\system32\msspi.dll
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At about this time, the variant appeared that was the hardest to
remove. Users started reporting that when they went to Google,
Yahoo or Altavista to search for something, popups appeared that
(most of the time) advertised bogus 'enhanced results'. This was
the one and only symptom.
After looking over the log, it was quickly concluded the
msspi.dll file was to blame. One expert took the file apart and
found several key URLs that were monitored, and when he changed
them to bogus URLs the popups were gone.
However, the file hooked into the Winsock LSP chain, which lies
very deep into the bowels of Windows and is one of the hardest
parts of Windows to manipulate. Only a very small selection of
spyware used this method of infection, and incorrect removal
left a computer with a broken Internet connection that could not
be fixed even by reinstalling Windows.
Luckily there were one or two tools that could fix a broken
Internet connection due to this problem.
LSPFix was the one used most since it allowed direct editing
of the LSP chain.
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CWs.Vrape |
Variant 5: CWS.Vrape - Mix and mangle
Approx date first sighted:
July 20, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=9067
Symptoms: Redirections to vrape.hardloved.com
on virtually anything done in IE, as well as redirections to
adult sites, dialers, etc
Cleverness: 5/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://vrape.hardloved.com/ top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,Search Page
= http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Local
Page = http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Local
Page = http:// vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 thehun.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 thehun.net
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 madthumbs.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 worldsex.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 teeniefiles.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 al4a.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 sublimedirectory.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 thumbzilla.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 sexocean.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 easypic.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 absolut-series.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 jpeg4free.com
O1 - Hosts: 65.77.83.222 thumbnailpost.com
O13 - DefaultPrefix: http://vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
O13 - WWW Prefix: http://vrape.hardloved.com/top/search.php?id=2&s=
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Perhaps the most widely spread variant of CoolWebSearch, this
one was a nightmare for the average user. It combined several
hijacking methods, along with random redirections to porn pages,
portals and even adult dialers.
The hijack covered most of IE, and a user was left to sit
helplessly and watch as almost his every move was redirected to
vrape.hardloved.com. One strange thing about this hijack though,
is that it operated alone: it didn't use any affiliates and even
redirected other adult sites to its own site. It has only been
connected with CWS since it appeared together with it in a few
logs.
The only good thing about this variant is that the domain
hardloved.com has been offline for more than half a week at the
time of writing. It is unknown whether this is because of the
sheer amount of users being routed to their site, DoS attacks by
irate users, account termination because of violation of their
host's user agreement, or something else.
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CWS.Oemsyspnp |
Variant 6: CWS.Oemsyspnp - Pure genius
Approx date first sighted:
July 29, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=8643
Symptoms: Start page/search pages changed to
allhyperlinks.com, activexupdate.com in the IE Trusted Zone,
reloading of the hijack on some reboots.
Cleverness: 10/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a bit of
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.adulthyperlinks.com/favorites/8
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.allhyperlinks.com/redir?lang={SUB_RFC1766}
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [SysPnP] rundll32
setupapi,InstallHinfSection OemVideoPnP 128 oemsyspnp.inf
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This variant was spotted nearly by sheer luck, since it used the
same Registry value as the second variant (Bootconf) 'SysPnp'.
This was a very clever hijack that disguised itself as a driver
update. When the computer was started, there was a 1 in 5 chance
the hijack was re-installed and changed the IE start page and
search pages to allhyperlinks.com.
However, once the hijack was identified, it was easy to stop:
only the autostarting oemsyspnp.inf file had to be disabled
using MSConfig, and then it could be safely deleted.
CWS.Oemsyspnp.2: A mutation of this
variant exists that uses the filename
keymgr3.inf, and the Registry value
keymgrldr instead.
CWS.Oemsyspnp.3: A mutation of this
variant exists that uses the filename
drvupd.inf, and the Regustry value
drvupd instead. It hijacks to searchforge.com.
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CWS.Svchost32 |
Variant 7: CWS.Svchost32 - Evading detection
Approx date first sighted:
August 3, 2003
Log reference:
http://boards.cexx.org/viewtopic.php?t=1027
Symptoms: Redirections to slawsearch.com when
accessing Google, searching on Yahoo or mistyping an URL
Cleverness: 10/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a process
killer
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page=http://www.slawsearch.com
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [svchost.exe]
"C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\svchost32.exe" |
This variant of CWS was focused on only evading existing
detection tools. What was visible in a HijackThis log wasn't
nearly all of it. The hijack installed dozens of redirections
from international Google domains, MSN and Yahoo search engines
to a webserver running at the user's own machine. The webserver
even had the seemingly unsuspicious filename of 'svchost32.exe'
to look like the Windows system file 'svchost.exe'. Anytime a
user accessed Google, searched with Yahoo or mistyped an URL, he
was redirected to slawsearch.com.
Fixing this hijack involved using a process killer to stop the
webserver process, and editing the Hosts file to remove the
Google/Yahoo/MSN redirections.
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CWS.Dnsrelay |
Variant 8: CWS.DNSRelay - Hey, that wasn't here before!
Approx date first sighted:
August 7, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=9074
Symptoms: Redirections to allhyperlinks.com
when omitting 'www' from an URL typed in IE
Cleverness: 8/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
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R3 - URLSearchHook: MailTo Class -
{01A9EB7D-69BC-11D2-AB2F-204C4F4F5020} -
C:\WINDOWS\System32\dnsrelay.dll |
A very clever hijack that uses a method never used before by any
other hijacker, this variant monitored all URLs entered into the
IE Address bar, and redirected any URLs starting without 'www'
to allhyperlinks.com. The hijack isn't very widespread, and is
also pretty hard to spot. Luckily, fixing it requires only
deleting one Registry value and one file.
CWS.Dnsrelay.2: A mutation of this
variant exists which uses the filename
ASTCTL32.OCX instead.
CWS.Dnsrelay.3: A mutation of this
variant exists which uses the filename
mswsc10.dll instead, which is located in
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Web Folders.
It hijacks IE to payfortraffic.net. It also adds a custom
stylesheet (like
CWS.Bootconf) located at C:\Program
Files\Internet Explorer\Readme.txt. (This file is not
present on uninfected systems.) It uses a Registry value named
nvstart to re-register the main
mswsc10.dll file on startup.
CWS.Dnsrelay.4: A mutation of this
variant exists that is like CWS.Dnsrelay.3,
but uses the filename mswsc20.dll
instead, located at the same place. It hijacks IE to
gofreegalleries.com, adds the same custom stylesheet, and uses
the hosts file to hijack numerous sites to allhyperlinks.com.
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CWS.Msinfo |
Variant 9: CWS.Msinfo - running out of ideas
Approx date first sighted:
August 22, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=9933
Symptoms: Redirection to Global-Finder.com,
hijack reappearing when rebooting, possible errors about a
missing file 'msinfo.exe'.
Cleverness: 6/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing and some .ini file editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://out.true-counter.com/b/?101 (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http://out.true-counter.com/a/?101 (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://out.true-counter.com/b/?101 (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://out.true-counter.com/c/?101 (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://out.true-counter.com/b/?101 (obfuscated)
F1 - win.ini:
run=C:\WINDOWS\..\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\MSINFO\msinfo.exe
F1 - win.ini: run=msinfo.exe
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [Internat Conf] \bootconf.exe |
This variant, using a file called 'msinfo.exe' to reinstall the
hijack on a reboot, appears to have several versions. The first
one seemed to malfunction often, as seen in the 'first sighted'
link where the file wasn't actually installed, but the reference
to it was. The second version probably fixed this a few days
later, since people started surfacing that had been hijacked by
this thing. Lastly, the third version appeared together with a
slightly mutated variant #2 (bootconf.exe).
The MSINFO.EXE is installed in a Windows folder where also the
legitimate MSINFO32.EXE file resides. It is ran from win.ini, a
method rarely used by programs nowadays. It sets nearly all
Start and Search pages from IE to URLs at out.true-counter.com,
and reinstates these whenever the system is restarted. Fixing
this variant involves resetting all the Registry values changed
for IE, editing the autorun values in win.ini and the Registry,
and deleting the two files.
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CWS.Ctfmon32 |
Variant 10: CWS.Ctfmon32 - SlawSearch part II
Approx date first sighted:
September 22, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=11886
Symptoms: Start page and Search pages changed
to www.slawsearch.com, 'Customize Search Assistant' closing
after opening it, hijack coming back after a reboot.
Cleverness: 3/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.slawsearch.com/autosearch.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.slawsearch.com/autosearch.html
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.slawsearch.com
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.slawsearch.com/autosearch.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= javascript:window.close()
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [CTFMON32.EXE]
"C:\WINDOWS\System32\ctfmon32.exe" |
This variant surfaced after a quiet time. CWShredder could fix
it, but it would return after rebooting the computer. Apart from
the new filename 'CTFMON32.EXE' (note that 'CTFMON.EXE' is the
real Windows system file) it worked pretty much the same way as
CWS.Bootconf: the file loads at startup, resetting homepages and
search pages, and then closes. Deleting the file and changing
everything back to normal fixes it.
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CWS.Tapicfg |
Variant 11: CWS.Tapicfg - Msinfo part 2
Approx date first sighted:
September 21, 2003
Log reference:
http://boards.cexx.org/viewtopic.php?t=2075
Symptoms: Slow scrolling in IE, redirections
to luckysearch.net, hijack returning on reboot, info32.exe
errors.
Cleverness: 8/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves quite
some Registry editing, win.ini editing and hosts file editing.
The style sheet files are marked read-only, system and hidden.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://acc.count-all.com/--/?oaoca (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://acc.count-all.com/--- /?oaoca (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://acc.count-all.com/-- /?oaoca (obfuscated)
F1 - win.ini:
run=C:\WINDOWS\..\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\MSINFO\info32.exe
O1 - Hosts: 3510794918 auto.search.msn.com
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [Tapicfg.exe] C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\tapicfg.exe
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINDOWS\Web\win.def
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINDOWS\default.css |
This hijack consists of only one file, that duplicates itself in
two places (info32.exe and tapicfg.exe) and acts different
depending on its filename. It drops two style sheets on
the system, hijacks to acc.count-all.com which redirects to
luckysearch.net, and reinstalls the hijack on each reboot. The
hosts file redirection also hijacks any mistyped domains to
luckysearch.net.
Though a file determining its actions depending on the filename
is very bad programming, it surprised me somewhat because it
works so well.
CWS.Tapicfg.2: A mutation of this
variant exists that uses the filename
soundmx.exe, and hijacks IE to globe-finder through a
redirection page at in.webcounter.cc. Possibly the same file is
loaded as fntldr.exe from WIN.INI. A
hosts file redirection of auto.search.msn.com to globe-finder is
installed. Two custom stylesheets named
tips.ini and hh.htt are
installed.
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CWS.Svcinit |
Variant 12: CWS.Svcinit - Sneaky little fellow
Approx date first sighted:
September 10, 2003
Log reference: Reconstruction
Symptoms: Homepage changed to xwebsearch.biz
and 'http:///', hijack returning on reboot or even sooner.
Cleverness: 9/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing, ini file editing and a process killer.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\System32\SVCINIT.EXE
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http:///
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http:///
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http:////
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://xwebsearch.biz
F1 - win.ini: run=C:\WINDOWS\svcinit.exe
O4 - HKLM\..\RunServices: [SVC Service] C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\svcinit.exe
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [mssys] C:\WINDOWS\mssys.exe |
Additional identifying line in StartupList log:
Checking Windows NT UserInit:
[HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon]
UserInit=C:\WINNT\System32\userinit.exe,C:\WINNT\System32\svcinit.exe
|
This variant was somewhat surprising, because fixing all the
items in HijackThis didn't remove it completely - it came back
after a reboot (on Windows 2000 and XP). Only after a user had
posted a StartupList log it became clear that this hijacker used
another additional method of running at boot, besides the two
visible in the HijackThis log. Terminating the running process,
and deleting the three autorun values fixed it. Also,
mssys.exe is possibly involved in this
hijack.
CWS.Svcinit.2: A mutation of this
variant exists, which uses the filename
svcpack.exe instead. It hijacks to http:/// (sic) and
uses the same autostarting methods as the first version.
Possibly it also drops the file SVCHOST.OLD
for unknown purposes.
CWS.Svcinit.3: Possibly, a mutation of
this variant exists, which hijacks to xwebsearch.biz and
http:/// (sic), as well as installing a hosts file redirection
of several dialer sites to searchmeup.com.
CWS.Svcinit.4: A mutation of this
variant exists, that hijacks IE to sex.free4porno.net, and adds
porn bookmarks to the IE Favorites and on the desktop. It
reinstalls from a file c:\windows\svchost.exe
(not a valid Windows system file, which is in the system32
folder), running at startup using the name
Online Service. It also uses the trojan file
msin32.dll for unknown reasons.
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CWS.Msoffice |
Variant 13: CWS.Msoffice - HTA exploit revisited
Approx date first sighted:
October 12, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=13362
Symptoms: Homepage changed to searchdot.net,
hijack coming back after a reboot, slow scrolling and text
typing in IE.
Cleverness: 7/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing, and using a command prompt to delete the
files.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.searchdot.net
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.searchdot.net
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http://www.searchdot.net
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://www.searchdot.net
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.searchdot.net
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [Msoffice] C:\WINDOWS\Fonts\msoffice.hta
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [Msoffice] C:\WINDOWS\Fonts\msoffice.hta
|
This variant uses a .hta script file to reinstall the hijack on
a reboot. The msoffice.hta file is
hard to find because the Fonts folder is a special folder for
Windows, setup to hide all files in it that are not font files.
Thus, a command prompt is needed to be able to see and delete
the file. Deleting the file and resetting the IE home and search
pages fixes the hijack.
CWS.Msoffice.:2 A mutation of this
variant exists that hijacks IE to sexpatriot.net and
royalsearch.net, installs a hosts file hijack of two porn sites
to 64.246.33.179, and reinstalls through a file named
fonts.hta using the name
AdobeFonts.
CWS.Msoffice.:3 A mutation of this
variant exists that hijacks IE to supersearch.com and
hugesearch.net, and reinstalls through a file named
fonts.hta using the name
TrueFonts. It also changes the
DefaultPrefix and WWW Prefix to redirect all URLs through
hugesearch.net.
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CWS.Dreplace |
Variant 14: Dreplace - Just a BHO... OR IS IT?
Approx date first sighted:
October 12, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=13497
Symptoms: Redirections to xwebsearch.biz and
213.159.117.233, hijack returning on reboot
Cleverness: 3/10 , 10/10 on second version
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http:///
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http:///
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http:///
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,HomeOldSP
= http://xwebsearch.biz/
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.117.233 sitefinder.verisign.com
O2 - BHO: HTML Source Editor -
{086AE192-23A6-48D6-96EC-715F53797E85} -
C:\WINDOWS\System32\DReplace.dll |
This variant installs a BHO with unknown purpose, though it's
probable the BHO is there to ensure xwebsearch.biz is set as
your homepage on reboot. It redirects the Verisign Sitefinder,
so all mistyped domains are redirected to 213.159.117.233.
CWS.Dreplace.2: There is a second
version of this variant that used the most dastardly trick I
have ever seen in a piece of malware. It changed the
dreplace.dll so fixing it with either
HijackThis or CWShredder will cause your entire system to fail
on Windows 98, 98SE and ME! The hijack is the same as the
first version for almost all other aspects, and both HijackThis
and CWShredder have been updated to circumvent the problem.
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CWS.Mupdate |
Variant 15: Mupdate - Turning up everywhere
Approx date first sighted:
October 13, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=13613
Symptoms: Homepage changing to searchv.com,
redirections to runsearch when mistyping URLs, *.masspass.com in
the Trusted Zone, hijack returning on a reboot.
Cleverness: 9/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing and lots of ini file editing.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page=http://www.searchv.com/search.html
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page=http://www.searchv.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar=http://www.searchv.com/search.html
F0 - system.ini: Shell=explorer.exe mupdate.exe
F1 - win.ini: run=mupdate.exe
F2 - REG:system.ini: Shell=explorer.exe mupdate.exe
O1 - Hosts: 209.66.114.130 sitefinder.verisign.com
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [sys] regedit -s sys.reg
O15 - Trusted Zone: *.masspass.com |
This variant isn't very common, but it makes up for this by
being very persistent in its existance. It's ran from 3 places
at boot, as well as merging a .reg file that reinstalls the
hijack, and adding an adult site to the Trusted Zone. It also
redirects any mistyped domains to runsearch.com.
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CWS.Addclass |
Variant 16: CWS.Addclass - Halloween edition
Approx date first sighted:
October 30, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.techguy.org/showthread.php?threadid=175680
Symptoms: Redirections through ehttp.cc
before reaching pages, IE homepage/searchpage changing to
rightfinder.net, hijack returning on reboot.
Cleverness: 4/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.rightfinder.net/search/
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.rightfinder.net/hp/
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.rightfinder.net/search/
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://www.rightfinder.net/search/
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [AddClass] C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\ADDCLASS.EXE
O13 - DefaultPrefix: http://ehttp.cc/?
O13 - WWW Prefix: http://ehttp.cc/? |
This one just surfaced when a sample (and thus a CWShredder
update) was found for it. The hijack involves AddClass.exe
installing the hijack and reinstalling it on reboot. It also
changes the DefaultPrefix, WWW Prefix and a non-functional
'www.' prefix which makes each URL you type without 'http://' in
front of it redirect through ehttp.cc before reaching the
correct destination. IOW, they log everywhere you go. Luckily
they are even kind enough to provide a uninstall for this
'Enhanced HTTP protocol' at their site
here. This will only partially remove CWS.Addclass though.
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CWS.Googlems |
Variant 17: CWS.Googlems - We have a payload!
Approx date first sighted:
November 1, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=16643
Symptoms: IE pages changed to http://www.idgsearch.com/,
hijack reinstalled on reboot and when running Windows Media
Player.
Cleverness: 7/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing, and reinstalling Windows Media Player
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.idgsearch.com/
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.idgsearch.com/
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.idgsearch.com/
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://www.idgsearch.com/
O2 - BHO: GoogleMS Search Helper -
{79369D5C-2903-4b7a-ADE2-D5E0DEE14D24} - C:\Documents and
Settings\[username]\Application Data\GoogleMS.dll |
This variant is first of its kind, since an important
development was observed here: the Windows Media Player
executable was deleted and replaced by the trojan. This file
reinstalled the hijack when ran. No other variants modify or
delete system files, but this one seems to.
It also installs a BHO that reinstalls hijack on a reboot.
Deleting GoogleMS.dll and reinstalling Windows Media Player
fixes the hijack.
CWS.Googlems.2: A mutation of this
variant exists that hijacks IE to idgsearch.com and
2020search.com, installs a BHO named 'Microsoft SearchWord'
using the filename SearchWord.dll in
the same location as the first version. It also adds
*.xxxtoolbar.com to the Trusted Zone.
CWS.Googlems.3: A mutation of this
variant exists that hijacks IE to idgsearch.com, installs a BHO
named 'Microsoft SearchWord' using the filename
Word10.dll in the location
C:\Documents And
Settings\[username]\Application Data\Microsoft\Office.
This version can also be loaded by a fake
Notepad.exe file in the Windows system folder. The fake
file has an icon different from the default notepad one.
CWS.Googlems.4: A mutation of this
variant exists that hijacks IE to idgsearch.com, 2020search.com
and possibly coundnotfind.com. It installs a hosts file hijack
to 69.56.223.196 (idgsearch.com), redirecting from several CWS
affiliate domains (!), one Lop.com domain, one misspelled
Spywareinfo domains (hehe) and several porn domains. It installs
a BHO named 'Microsoft Excel' using the filename
Excel10.dll, located at the same place
as the third mutation. It also adds *.xxxtoolbar.com and *.teensguru.com
to the Trusted Zone.
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CWS.Xplugin |
Variant 18: CWS.Xplugin - 'Helping' you search the web
Approx date first sighted:
November 11, 2003
Log reference:
Not visible in HijackThis log!
Symptoms: Some links in Google results
redirecting to umaxsearch.com or coolwebsearch.com every now and
then
Cleverness: 10/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
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Not visible in HijackThis log!
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This variant is the first one that is not visible in a
HijackThis log. It works invisible, changing links from Google
search results to other pages. It took a while to find out how
this variant works, since it doesn't use any of the standard
locations.
A file xplugin.dll is installed, which
creates a new protocol filter for text/html.
In normal english, this means it reads most of the web pages
downloaded to your browser. It also randomly alters some links
in Google search results to pages on umaxsearch.com and
coolwebsearch.com. It claims to be made by something called
TMKSoft.
It is unknown if deleting the file has no side-effects, but
using CWShredder or running regsvr32 /u
c:\windows\system32\xplugin.dll (may vary depending on
Windows version) fixes the hijack completely.
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CWS.Alfasearch |
Variant 19: CWS.Alfasearch - Child's Play
Approx date first sighted:
November 5, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=16730
Symptoms: IE pages changed to alfa-search.com,
possibly porn sites being redirected to 216.200.3.32 (alfa-search.com),
error message about a 'runtime error' at startup, 4 porn
bookmarks added to favorites (one possible child porn).
Cleverness: 1/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a little
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.alfa-search.com/search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.alfa-search.com/home.html
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.alfa-search.com/home.html
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.alfa-search.com/search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\SearchURL,(Default)
= http://www.alfa-search.com/search.html
O4 - Global Startup: MSupdate.exe |
Possibly the most simple CWS variant since
CWS.Datanotary, this hijack only does the basic stuff:
changes your IE homepage and search pages, adds porn bookmarks,
and pops up a bogus error message at startup.
Deleting MSupdate.exe from the All
Users Startup group, deleting the porn bookmarks and resetting
the IE homepage and search pages fixed the hijack.
The MSupdate.exe file is capable of
installing a hosts file hijack as well, but doesn't seem to do
this.
CWS.Alfasearch.2: A mutation of this
variant exists, that hijacks IE to www.find-itnow.com, drops 7
porn bookmarks in the IE Favorites, and causes error messages
concerning 'Win Min' at system shutdown, as well as bogus
runtime errors at system startup. It drops a fake
Winlogon.exe file in the 'All Users'
Startup group of the Start Menu, or in the Startup group of the
current user. The file is always running, and hard to remove.
If CWShredder repeatedly reports removing this variant, it
cannot remove winlogon.exe. To
remove this file manually, move it out of the Startup folder,
restart, and then delete the file.
CWS.Alfasearch.3: A mutation of this
variant exists, that hijacks IE to www.alfa-search.com, and
reinstalls by running an encryped VBS script from three places
in the Registry, named rundll32.vbe
using the name Windows Security Assistant.
It also installs a custom stylesheet named
readme.txt in the Windows sytem folder, drops 9 porn
bookmarks in the IE Favorites and 6 on the desktop, and installs
a hosts file hijack of 8 major search engines and one porn site
to 64.124.222.169 (alfa-search.com).
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CWS.Loadbat |
Variant 20: CWS.Loadbat - Dastardly
Approx date first sighted:
November 1, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=16132
Symptoms: DOS window flashing by at system
startup, IE pages being hijacked to ie-search.com, redirection
to 'FLS' or Umaxsearch when mistyping URLs or visiting porn
sites
Cleverness: 9/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing and deleting a few files
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://ie-search.com/srchasst.html (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://ie-search.com/home.html (obfuscated)
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = c:\windows\hp.htm
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://ie-search.com/home.html (obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://ie-search.com/srchasst.html (obfuscated)
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.105 auto.search.msn.com
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.105 sitefinder.verisign.com
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.105 sitefinder-idn.verisign.com
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.103 www.smutserver.com
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.103 www1.smutserver.com
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.103 www2.smutserver.com
[...]
O1 - Hosts: 206.161.200.103 www29.smutserver.com
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [Windows Shell Library Loader] load
shell.dll /c /set -- by windows setup --
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [Win64 Compatibility Check] load
win64.drv /c /set -- by windows setup -- |
Overlooked at first, this CWS variant used a clever way of
reloading the hijack by making it look like some other file (shell.dll
or win64.drv) was doing it, when in fact it was just a
LOAD.BAT file merging a .reg file.
The second variant added a hosts file hijack of
auto.search.msn.com and the Verisign Sitefinder to something
called 'FLS' that linked to Umaxsearch, as well as hijacking
smutserver.com domains to another porn site.
To remove this manually, killing the autostarts and removing
hp.htm , load.bat
and srch.reg from the Windows folder
along with resetting the IE homepage/search page is enough.
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CWS.Qttasks |
Variant 21: CWS.Qttasks - Even more simple than
CWS.Alfasearch
Approx date first sighted:
November 23, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=18331
Symptoms: IE pages being changed to start-space.com
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.start-space.com/
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.start-space.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,HomeOldSP
= http://www.start-space.com/
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [QuickTime Task] c:\windows\qttasks.exe
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Mimicking the legit 'QuickTime Task' autorun entry in the
Registry (which is in the HKLM hive), this variant loaded at
startup and changed only the Start Page to start-space.com.
That's it. I'm serious. *Yawn*
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CWS.Msconfd |
Variant 22: CWS.Msconfd - Finally using rundll32
Approx date first sighted:
November 26, 2003
Log reference: Reconstruction, local test
Symptoms: IE pages being changed to
webcoolsearch.com, bogus error message about msconfd.dll at
startup, porn bookmarks added to Favorites (some possibly
childporn)
Cleverness: 7/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves quite
some Registry editing and deleting porn bookmarks, plus
struggling to unload the dll which is always in memory
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://webcoolsearch.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://webcoolsearch.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://webcoolsearch.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://webcoolsearch.com/
O4 - HKLM\..\RunServices: [Desktop] rundll32.exe
msconfd,Restore ControlPanel |
Additional line from StartupList log:
Load/Run keys from Registry:
HKLM\..\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows: AppInit_DLLs=msconfd.dll
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This is the first variant to use a dll file together with the
Windows rundll32 file. This makes it a little harder to find the
culprit msconfd.dll, responsible for
hijacking IE to webcoolsearch.com and adding 11 adult bookmarks
to IE, of which 4 are possibly child porn sites.
Deleting the autorun entry, resetting IE and deleting the porn
bookmarks fixes most of the hijack. Removing
msconfd.dll involves renaming the file, restarting the
system and deleting the renamed file.
CWS.Msconfd.2: A mutation of this
variant exists, that uses the filename
avpcc.dll or ctrlpan.dll that
hooks into Windows in the same way as the first version. This
version also deletes all the bookmarks in the IE Favorites
folder, before replacing them with porn bookmarks.
CWS.Msconfd.3: A mutation of this
variant exists, that uses the filename
cpan.dll.
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CWS.Therealsearch |
Variant 23: CWS.Therealsearch - Misery travels in pairs
Approx date first sighted:
November 29, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=19137
Symptoms: IE pages changed to
therealsearch.com, porn bookmarks added to IE Favorites, porn
sites appearing in IE autocomplete
Cleverness: 4/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing, a process killer, and deleting bookmarks
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\quicken.exe
C:\WINDOWS\editpad.exe
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://www.therealsearch.com/sp.php
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.therealsearch.com/sp.php
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.therealsearch.com/sp.php
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.therealsearch.com/hp.php
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.therealsearch.com/sp.php
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [quicken] C:\WINDOWS\quicken.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [editpad] C:\WINDOWS\editpad.exe |
This variant of CWS appeared to be worse than it actually was at
first. Since it had two running processes, it looked like the
Peper virus, that was very hard to remove. Luckily these two
processes didn't behave like that. The smallest one
quicken.exe downloaded and ran the
second one editpad.exe (like
CWS.Aff.Iedll does) and hijacked IE to therealsearch.com, as
well as setting themselves to run at startup.
To remove this variant a process killer is needed to kill
editpad.exe and
quicken.exe and deleting the files, as well as resetting
the IE homepage/search pages and possibly removing
CWS.Aff.Tooncomics.2 which can be downloaded by this
variant.
CWS.Therealsearch.2: There is a
mutation of this variant that hijacks to my.search (sic), that
also the filenames c:\windows\winrar.exe
and c:\windows\waol.exe.
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CWS.Control |
Variant 24: CWS.Control - Dude, where's my Control Panel?
Approx date first sighted:
December 7, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=23210
Symptoms: IE pages changed to windoww.cc,
super-spider.com and search2004.net
Cleverness: 3/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing, and restoring a file from the Windows Setup CD
for Windows 9x/ME
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.windowws.cc/ sp.htm?id=9
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.windowws.cc/ sp.htm?id=9
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.windowws.cc/ hp.htm?id=9
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,HomeOldSP
= http://super-spider.com
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [Windows Control] C:\WINDOWS\CONTROL.EXE
O4 - HKCU\..\RunServices: [Windows Control] C:\WINDOWS\CONTROL.EXE
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This variant is fairly simple, if it wouldn't drop a file in the
Windows folder that overwrites a system file in Windows 9x/ME -
it is possible your Control Panel will not be functioning
normally after being infected with this CWS variant, and you
need to use the System File Checker (SFC.EXE) to restore
control.exe from your Windows Setup
CD. Windows NT/2000/XP does not have this problem with this
variant.
CWS.Control.2: A mutation of this
variant exists that is identical in every way, but where
control.exe always stays in memory.
CWS.Control.3: A mutation of this
variant exists that uses random filenames and random startups.
|
|
|
CWS.Olehelp |
Variant 25: CWS.Olehelp - Who wants some bookmarks?
Approx date first sighted:
January 4, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=27573
Symptoms: IE hijacked to omega-search.com,
lots and lots of bookmarks added to IE Favorites
Cleverness: 3/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a little
bit of Registry editing, and deleting lots of files
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\OLEHELP.EXE
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://www.omega-search.com/go/panel_search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.omega-search.com/go panel_search.html
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://www.omega-search.com/go/panel_search.html
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [olehelp] C:\WINDOWS\olehelp.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [svchost] C:\WINDOWS\olehelp.exe |
This variant is pretty simple. It autoruns a file named
olehelp.exe at startup from the
Registry, which changes the IE homepage/search page to omega-search.com,
and adds a mind-boggling 107 bookmarks to the IE Favorites, of
which 14 are porn.
Killing the autostart and deleting the file + bookmarks fixes
this.
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CWS.Smartsearch |
Variant 26: CWS.Smartsearch - Counter-counter-actions
Approx date first sighted:
January 7, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=26148
Symptoms: IE hijacked to smartsearch.ws,
redirections to smartsearch.ws when entering incomplete URLs
into the address bar, antispyware programs closing without
reason only a few seconds after opening them
Cleverness: 5/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a process
killer, lots of registry editing and deleting a few files.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\Program Files\directx\directx.exe
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://smartsearch.ws/?q=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://smartsearch.ws/?q=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://smartsearch.ws/?q=
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://smartsearch.ws
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http://smartsearch.ws
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://smartsearch.ws/?q=
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://smartsearch.ws/?q=
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [SystemEmergency] C:\Program Files\directx\directx.exe
O4 - HKLM\..\RunServices: [SystemEmergency] C:\Program
Files\directx\directx.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [SystemEmergency] C:\Program Files\directx\directx.exe
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [UserSystem] C:\Windows\iexplorer.exe
O4 - HKLM\..\RunServices: [UserSystem] C:\Windows\iexplorer.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [UserSystem] C:\Windows\iexplorer.exe
O13 - DefaultPrefix: http://smartsearch.ws/?q=
O13 - WWW Prefix: http://smartsearch.ws/?q= |
This variant is mostly hard to spot since it can use over a
dozen different filenames, luckily all with the same registry
value. The file is always running and reinstalls the hijack to
smartsearch.ws every 10 seconds. Killing the trojan process,
deleting/restoring all the Registry values it added or changed
and deleting its files fixed the hijack.
CWS.Smartsearch.2: A mutation of this
variant exists that attempts to close CWShredder, HijackThis,
Ad-Aware, Spybot S&D and the SpywareInfo forums when they are
opened. It uses the filename
IEXPLORER.EXE (note the extra 'R') and a different
Registry value. It drops a hosts file that blocks over two
dozen anti-spyware sites. CWShredder has been updated to
circumvent this.
CWS.Smartsearch.3: A mutation of this
variant exists that uses the startup 'coolwebprogram', and
attempts to close CWShredder, HijackThis, Ad-Aware, Spybot S&D
and the SpywareInfo forums when they are opened. It also
drops notepad32.exe and hijacks the
.txt and .log filetypes to open with this file (before showing
it in the real Notepad), reinstalling the hijack.
CWS.Smartsearch.4: A mutation of this
variant exists that hijacks to magicsearch.ws
instead of smartsearch.ws, uses the startup 'MicrosoftWindows'
and also drops the notepad32.exe
Notepad hijacker like CWS.Smartsearch.3. It also hijacks the
DefaultPrefix and WWW Prefix to magicsearch.ws like
CWS.Vrape and attempts to kill several firewalls,
including (but not limited to) ZoneAlarm and Kerio Personal
Firewall.
Known filenames used by this variant:
C:\Program Files\directx\directx.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\systeem.exe
C:\Windows\explore.exe (note the missing 'r')
C:\Windows\System\internet.exe
C:\Windows\Media\wmplayer.exe
C:\Windows\Help\helpcvs.exe
C:\Program Files\Accessories\accesss.exe
C:\Games\systemcritical.exe
C:\Documents Settings\sistem.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Windows Media Player\wmplayer.exe
C:\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Game.exe
C:\Windows\sistem.exe
C:\Windows\System\RunDll16.exe
C:\Windows\iexplorer.exe (note the extra 'i' or the extra 'r')
C:\y.exe
C:\x.exe
c:\funny.exe
c:\funniest.exe
c:\Windows\notepad32.exe
C:\Windows\system\kazaa.exe
C:\Windows\system32\kazaa.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\iexplorer.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\explore.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\exploreer.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\sistem.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\critical.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\directx.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\internet.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\window.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\winmgnt.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\clrssn.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\explorer32.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\win32e.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\directx32.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\uninstall.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\volume.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\autorun.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\users32.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\notepad.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\win64.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\inetinf.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\time.exe
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Services\systeem.exe
c:\Windows\system32\iexplorer.exe
c:\Windows\system32\explore.exe
c:\Windows\system32\exploreer.exe
c:\Windows\system32\sistem.exe
c:\Windows\system32\critical.exe
c:\Windows\system32\directx.exe
c:\Windows\system32\internet.exe
c:\Windows\system32\window.exe
c:\Windows\system32\winmgnt.exe
c:\Windows\system32\clrssn.exe
c:\Windows\system32\explorer32.exe
c:\Windows\system32\win32e.exe
c:\Windows\system32\directx32.exe
c:\Windows\system32\uninstall.exe
c:\Windows\system32\volume.exe
c:\Windows\system32\autorun.exe
c:\Windows\system32\users32.exe
c:\Windows\system32\win64.exe
c:\Windows\system32\inetinf.exe
c:\Windows\system32\time.exe
c:\Windows\system32\systeem.exe
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CWS.Yexe |
Variant 27: CWS.Yexe - Whatever
Approx date first sighted:
January 17, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.tomcoyote.org/index.php?showtopic=3174
Symptoms: IE start page hijacked to
search.thestex.com
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves deleting
some Registry values and keys, deleting one folder and restoring
the IE homepage
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
F1 - win.ini: run=C:\WINNT\system32\services\y.exe
O2 - BHO: (no name) -
{5321E378-FFAD-4999-8C62-03CA8155F0B3} -
C:\WINDOWS\System\services\1.00.07.dll
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [xpsystem] C:\WINNT\system32\services\y.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [xpsystem] C:\WINNT\system32\services\y.exe
|
This variant uses a filename often seen as installer for either
CWS or Lop.com (y.exe), but uses it as the actual hijacker file.
It loads from win.ini as well as system.ini in a weird way that
shouldn't even work, and installs a BHO with seemingly the
purpose to react to certain keywords on webpages. Removing the
BHO and the autorunning y.exe file fixes this hijack.
CWS.Yexe.2: Possibly a mutation of this
variant exists that uses the filename
services.exe instead of y.exe.
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CWS.Gonnasearch |
Variant 28: CWS.Gonnasearch - Three for the price of one
Approx date first sighted:
January 18, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=28344
Symptoms: IE hijacked to gonnasearch.com
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves deleting
some registry keys and values
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.gonnasearch.com/ iesearch.php?ref=sb
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.gonnasearch.com/?ref=sp
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.gonnasearch.com/ iesearch.php?ref=sb
R1 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.gonnasearch.com/?ref=sp
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,CustomizeSearch
= http://www.gonnasearch.com/ iesearch.php?ref=sb
O2 - BHO: SearchAddon -
{799A370D-5993-4887-9DF7-0A4756A77D00} -
C:\PROGRA~1\INTERN~1\Toolbar\SEARCH~1.DLL
O2 - BHO: AutoSearch -
{A55581DC-2CDB-4089-8878-71A080B22342} -
C:\PROGRA~1\INTERN~1\Toolbar\AUTOSE~1.DLL
O2 - BHO: (no name) -
{E7AFFF2A-1B57-49C7-BF6B-E5123394C970} -
C:\PROGRA~1\INTERN~1\Toolbar\webinfo.dll |
This variant differs from the others in that it installs not
one, but three (!) BHOs. Their exact purpose is unknown. Killing
the three BHOs and restoring the IE pages fixed this hijack.
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CWS.Smartfinder |
Variant 29: CWS.Smartfinder - Turning over new stones
Approx date first sighted:
January 11, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=27673&hl=nkvd\.us
Symptoms: IE hijacked to nkvd.us and smart-finder.biz,
redirections to nkvd.us and smart-finder.biz when typing
incomplete URLs into address bar.
Cleverness: 10/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
registry editing, and renaming the trojan file, restarting, and
deleting it
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://www.nkvd.us/s.htm
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://www.nkvd.us/s.htm
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.nkvd.us/s.htm
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.nkvd.us/1507/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http://www.nkvd.us/s.htm
O13 - DefaultPrefix: http://www.nkvd.us/1507/
O13 - WWW Prefix: http://www.nkvd.us/1507/
O13 - Home Prefix: http://www.nkvd.us/1507/
O13 - Mosaic Prefix: http://www.nkvd.us/1507/ |
Additional line in StartupList log:
Enumerating ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad items:
DDE Control Module: C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\mtwirl32.dll |
This variant was surprisingly smart: it used two startup methods
(ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad and SharedTaskScheduler) that have
to be the absolutely rarely used ones seen ever - and it used
them differently on Windows 9x/ME and Windows NT/2k/XP. On top
of that, both methods ensure that the file is loaded when
Explorer is loaded, making it always in memory like
CWS.Msconfd. Additionally, the actual responsible files are
invisible in HijackThis, and only one shows in a StartupList
logfile (ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad). The responsible file is
mtwirl32.dll, and to delete it
manually you need to rename it (deleting is impossible since it
is in use), restart the system, and then delete the file and its
Registry key.
CWS.Smartfinder.2: a second version of
this variant exists, that is harder to remove but basically uses
the same method of loading, as well as the same CLSID. In
addition, it uses a BHO to restore any of the autostarting
regkeys you delete to remove this. The BHO looks like this in a
HijackThis log:
|
O2 - BHO: OsbornTech Popup Blocker -
{FF1BF4C7-4E08-4A28-A43F- 9D60A9F7A880} -
C:\WINDOWS\System32\mshelper.dll |
Deleting this BHO prevents it from restoring the autostarting
regkeys, which can then be deleted safely.
Note that this BHO is NOT the real Osborntech Popup Blocker,
which uses the CLSID {C68AE9C0-0909-4DDC-B661-C1AFB9F5AE53}, and
a mshelper.dll file located in a
separate folder in the Program Files folder. |
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CWS.Winproc32 |
Variant 30: CWS.Winproc32 - I can't think of anything snappy
to say here
Approx date first sighted:
January 23, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.net-integration.net/index.php?showtopic=10128
Symptoms: IE being hijacked to icanfindit.net
or 4-counter.com, hijack returning on system restart or possibly
sooner
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves using a
process killer and some Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\WINPROC32.EXE
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer,SearchURL =
http://4-counter.com/?a=2
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://4-counter.com/?a=2
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://4- counter.com/?a=2
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://4-counter.com/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= http://4- counter.com/?a=2
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [Windows Internet Protocol]
C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\WINPROC32.EXE |
A very simple variant. Winproc32.exe
loads at startup, and hijacks IE. The file stays in memory so a
process killer is needed to remove it. It drops 4 porn bookmarks
in the IE Favorites folder. It also tries to hijack the default
user (HKEY_USERS\.DEFAULT) but fails to do so.
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CWS.Msconfig |
Variant 31: - CWS.Msconfig - Payload plus one
Approx date first sighted:
February 5, 2004 (also a nice example of how frustrating
these things can be to people)
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=31324
Symptoms: IE pages being hijacked to
www.31234.com on system startup and when changing homepage back,
continuous errors about an invalid Registry script in temp2.txt,
extra item in right-click menu of webpages named '??????'
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a process
killer, some Registry editing and restoring a Windows system
file from CD
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\MSCONFIG.EXE
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.31234.com/www/homepage.html
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.31234.com/www/homepage.html
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [msconfig] C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\msconfig.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [msconfig] C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\msconfig.exe
O8 - Extra context menu item: ?????? -
C:\WINDOWS\system32\openme.htm |
This variant uses the filename msconfig.exe
which overwrites the real Windows file in Windows 98/98SE/ME.
The temp2.txt file it drops is
actually a Registry script, but since it's in the wrong format,
Windows 9x/ME will throw up an error about an invalid Registry
script. Windows 2000/XP will import it without complaining,
creating the '??????' item in the IE right-click menu. The
msconfig.exe file will always stay in
memory, reinstalling the hijack every 5 seconds. Killing the
process, deleting the file and restoring the IE homepages/search
pages fixes this hijack.
The real Windows file msconfig.exe can
be download
here, if you can't restore it from your Windows Setup CD for
some reason.
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CWS.Xxxvideo |
Variant 32: CWS.Xxxvideo - What, you mean it's not an xxx
video?
Approx date first sighted:
February 11, 2004
Log reference:
http://www.spywareinfo.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=32381
Symptoms: IE pages changed to
enjoysearch.info, 4 bookmarks added to Favorites, all returning
when system is restarted
Cleverness: 3/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,SearchURL
= http:// www.enjoysearch.info/search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http:// www.enjoysearch.info/search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http:// www.enjoysearch.info/search.html
R0 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http:// www.enjoysearch.info/
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [xxxvid] C:\WINDOWS\system32\xxxvideo.hta
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [xxxvid] C:\Documents and
Settings\<username>\My Documents\xxxvideo.hta |
A very simple variant, with a encrypted script file running at
startup, reinstalling the hijack. Killing the autorun entries,
deleting the two .hta files and the four bookmarks fixes this.
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CWS.Winres |
Variant 33: CWS.Winres - About:blank hacked
Approx date first sighted:
February 10, 2004
Log reference:
http://www.spywareinfo.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=32204
Symptoms: IE pages changed to 2020search.com,
about:blank page changed to search engine
Cleverness: 7/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,SearchURL
= about:blank
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http:// www.2020search.com/search/9884/search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= about:blank
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page_bak = about:blank
O2 - BHO: Windows Resources -
{2D38A51A-23C9-48a1-A33C-48675AA2B494} - C:\WINDOWS\winres.dll
O15 - Trusted Zone: *.i-lookup.com
O15 - Trusted Zone: *.offshoreclicks.com
O15 - Trusted Zone: *.teensguru.com |
This variant is the first to achieve a remarkable result: it
changes the about:blank page itself to look like a search
engine. This is later seen in the
CWS.Xmlmimefilter variant, using a different method. The
variant possibly adds three domains to the Trusted Zone and adds
two bookmarks to the desktop.
Deleting the BHO, resetting the IE homepage, and removing the
sites and bookmarks fixes this.
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CWS.Xmlmimefilter |
Variant 34: CWS.Xmlmimefilter - About:blank hacked v2.0
Approx date first sighted:
February 29, 2004
Log reference:
http://computercops.biz/postt21263.html
Symptoms: IE homepage changed to about:blank,
which is changed to a search engine named 'Microsoft Search the
Web', mistyped URLs being redirected to this same search engine
Cleverness: 10/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves quite
some Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.117.235 auto.search.msn.com
O18 - Protocol: about -
{53B95211-7D77-11D2-9F80-00104B107C96} -
C:\WINDOWS\System32\msxmlpp.dll |
Though the hijacking of the about:blank page was also done by
the
CWS.Winres variant, this new variant accomplishes it in a
much more elegant way. The DLL itself used for handling the
'about:' protocol is changed to a malicious
msxmlpp.dll one, displaying a search engine instead of a
blank page filled with links to 66.117.38.91.
Changing the CLSID of the about protocol back to the default
{3050F406-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B},
deleting the file and removing the hosts file hijack fixes this.
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CWS.Aboutblank |
Variant 35: CWS.Aboutblank - It's just a fad
Approx date first sighted:
March 2, 2004
Log reference:
Reconstruction
Symptoms: IE pages changed to about-blank.ws
and 213.159.118.226 (1-se.com), hijack returning on system
restart
Cleverness: 5/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing and deleting a randomly named file
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,SearchURL
= http://about-blank.ws/page/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://about-blank.ws/page/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Search_URL
= http://about-blank.ws/page/
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page_bak = http://about-blank.ws/
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 1-se.com
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 58q.com
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 aifind.cc
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 aifind.info
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 allneedsearch.com
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 approvedlinks.com
[..]
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 www.wazzupnet.com
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 www.websearch.com
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 www.windowws.cc
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 www.xgmm.com
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 xwebsearch.biz
O1 - Hosts: 213.159.118.226 yourbookmarks.ws
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [Network Service] C:\WINNT\svchost.exe-sr
-0
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [Network Service] C:\WINNT\svchost.exe-sr
-0
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINNT\system32\xea2108l.9zt |
This variant does everything in its powers to redirect you to a
domain owned by 1-se.com. IE is hijacked to it, the hosts file
is replaced to redirect about 100 porn and CWS domains to
1-se.com, and a randomly named stylesheet is dropped that
redirects to 1-se.com when certain keywords appear in webpages.
Restoring the IE pages by searching the Registry for about-blank.ws,
removing the hosts file, the svchost.exe file in the Windows
directory (the one in the System32 folder is legit) and the
randomly named stylesheet (1079 or 1087 bytes in size) fixed
this.
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CWS.Systeminit |
Variant 35: CWS.Systeminit - Actual size
Approx date first sighted:
March 21, 2004
Log reference:
http://www.spywareinfo.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=35845
Symptoms: IE pages changed to your-search.info,
redirections to search-dot.com, hijack returning on system
reboot, URL shortcuts appearing on desktop and in favorites
Cleverness: 2/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://www.your- search.info/search.html
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://www.your- search.info/start.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Default_Page_URL
= http:// www.your-search.info/start.html
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [system32.dll] C:\WINDOWS\system\systeminit.exe
O4 - Global Startup: sytem32.exe
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINDOWS\sstyle.css
O19 - User stylesheet: C:\WINDOWS\sstyle.css (HKLM) |
A small variant, using two files to reinstall the hijack. The
stylesheet links to search-dot.com, the two autostarting files
set the IE homepage/search pages to your-search.info. A backup
of the systeminit.exe file is kept at
C:\Documents And Settings\sys.exe (this location is
hardcoded into the trojan file). Deleting the three trojan
files, the stylesheet, the bookmarks and restoring the IE pages
fixes this hijack.
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CWS.Sounddrv |
Variant 36: CWS.Sounddrv - Boring, yet sneaky
Approx date first sighted:
March 12, 2004
Log reference:
http://boards.cexx.org/viewtopic.php?t=4542
Symptoms: IE pages changed to
defaulsearching.com, hijack returning on system reboot.
Cleverness: 3/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves some
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = http://defaultsearching.com/search.html
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://defaultsearching.com
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://defaultsearching.com
O4 - HKCU\..\RunOnce: [sounddrv]
C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\SNDBDRV3104.EXE |
This variant is very small, but its sneakiness lies in the
filename used, which was originally mistaken for a sound card
driver (by me as well). Apart from that, this hijack is really
simple. Deleting the file and restoring the IE pages fixes this
hijack.
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CWS.Searchx |
Variant 38: CWS.Searchx - About:blank seems popular lately
Approx date first sighted:
April 6, 2004
Log reference:
http://forums.techguy.org/t217853.html
Symptoms: IE pages changed to about:blank
(which is changed to a search portal linking to searchx.cc) and
a search page inside a DLL on the system, hijack returning on
system reboot
Cleverness: 8/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots of
Registry editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Bar = res://C:\WINDOWS\System32\gfmnaaa.dll/sp.html
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = res://C:\WINDOWS\System32\gfmnaaa.dll/sp.html
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Search,SearchAssistant
= res:// C:\WINDOWS\System32\gfmnaaa.dll/sp.html
(obfuscated)
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,HomeOldSP
= about:blank
O2 - BHO: (no name) - {48918FB4-1FD5-4DF3-87F0-
12C36350039D} - C:\WINDOWS\System32\gfmnaaa.dll |
This variant is not very hard to spot, but slightly harder to
troubleshoot since its symptoms look a lot like those of
CWS.Xmlmimefilter. It drops a randomly named DLL in the
system folder and sets the IE homepage/search pages to it. A BHO
is also added pointing to the same DLL. The about:blank page is
modified by creating two new protocol filters for
text/html and
text/plain which allows the DLL to control most of the
content flowing through the IE browser as web pages. The trojan
keeps a record of all actions in a log file at
c:\filter.log. Removing the two
filters in the Registry, deleting the BHO, the DLL and the
logfile and restoring the IE pages fixes this hijack.
Note: The
CWS.Realyellowpage has been sighted together with this
variant sometimes, causing CWShredder to not be able to remove
this one. Refer to the manual removal method for that variant to
delete the offending dll, then run CWShredder again to remove
CWS.Searchx.
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CWS.Realyellowpage |
Variant 39: CWS.Realyellowpage - Inducing homocidal
tendencies
Approx date first sighted:
March 16, 2004
Log reference:
(not visible in HijackThis log)
Symptoms: IE pages changed to real-yellow-page.com,
drxcount.biz, list2004.com or linklist.cc, hijack inexplicably
returning on reboot with no file seemingly responsible
Cleverness: Where's my infinity character
button?
Manual removal difficulty: Battle axe or
chainsaw recommended
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
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(not visible in HijackThis) |
This variant is a nightmare. If you come across an infected
machine that keeps changing back to the aforementioned sites
over and over again for no visible reason, you've probably seen
this one. It's like whoever is reponsible for this hired some
blackhat coder and told him to make the most complex, invisible
and devious hijacker he could think of. And he did.
The file is randomly named, and normally hooks into the IE
process, loading itself as a module into it. And then it hides
the host process from the process list. Yes, you read that
right, the process hosting the dll disappears from the
task list and most process viewers/managers we tried.
At first it was only visible with FAR Explorer, later we found
PrcView also shows it, and has some nice command-line
options which makes for nice scripting to aid in manual removal.
For Windows 95/98/ME, booting the system into Safe Mode will
prevent the file from loading, allowing for even easier manual
removal:
* MANUAL REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS *
- Download PrcView here:
http://www.spywareinfo.com/~merijn/files/pv.zip, unzip
it to the desktop.
- Be sure to have at least 1 Internet Explorer window
open, then double click on the runme.bat.
- Select option '2' from the menu.
- Notepad will open with a log in it. Look for a line with
this file, size and beginning to it.
- The filename will always be different:
winajbm.dll 61c00000 61440 c:\windows\system32\winajbm.dll
This part indicates the bad file:
61c00000 61440
It will always start with that header.
- Write down the filename behind it.
- Now download KillBox:
http://download.broadbandmedic.com/VbStuff/KillBox.zip
- Unzip and run it.
- Don't click any of the buttons though, instead please
click on the Action menu and choose "Delete on Reboot".
- On the next screen, click on the File menu and choose
"Add File". The file you copied earlier should now show up
in the window. If that's successful, choose the Action menu
and select "Process and Reboot". You'll be prompted to
reboot, do so.
- After rebooting, make sure the file is gone.
Tech info: Win9x/ME: Known to use the HKLM RunServicesOnce
key to load, which is deleted by Windows after loading the file
and recreated by the dll when Windows shuts down. Visible in
Safe Mode, dll file is not loaded then and can be deleted.
WinNT/2000/XP: Known to use the HKLM AppInit_DLLs value to load,
possibly more Registry keys. The 'delete file on reboot'
function can be used (KillBox does this), provided the filename
is known.
File is heavily encrypted using an unknown packer, has a
modified PE header and crashes most (if not all) memory dumpers
when attempted to dump the file from memory. Hides the dll as
well as the host process (IEXPLORE.EXE, RUNDLL32.EXE,
CONTROL.EXE, REGSVR32.EXE, whichever one is used) by an unknown
method.
Right now [17/04/04], CWShredder does not
remove this variant. As soon as I figure out how to do it, I
will update CWShredder for it. |
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Affiliate variants - not directly related to CWS, but sighted
together with it very often |
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CWS.Aff.Iedll |
Affiliate variant: iedll - Bad coder
Approx date first sighted:
August 18, 2003
Log reference:
http://boards.cexx.org/viewtopic.php?t=1499
Symptoms: Errors in a file 'iedll.exe' or 'loader.exe'
on Windows startup. Sighted a lot together with other CWS
variants.
Cleverness: 3/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a process
killer and a bit of Registry editing.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\IEDLL.EXE
C:\WINDOWS\LOADER.EXE
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [iedll] C:\WINDOWS\iedll.exe
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [loader] C:\WINDOWS\loader.exe |
This affiliate variant, with unknown origin, consists of two
files. The first one, loader.exe
downloads the second one, iedll.exe
and runs it. Both files are set to autostart when Windows
starts. The 'hijack' becomes obvious when
iedll.exe crashes - and it does this frequently.
Apparently, this program is programmed so badly, it won't even
carry out its payload and does not hijack IE. It is only
displayed here because it has been sighted together with other
CWS variants on very numerous occasions.
CWS.Aff.iedll.2: A mutation of this
variant exists, that has the same files
iedll.exe and loader.exe
located at C:\Program Files\Windows Media
Player.
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CWS.Aff.Winshow |
Affiliate variant: Winshow - Comes in two flavours
Approx date first sighted:
July 13, 2003
Log reference: Reconstruction
Symptoms: Changed IE pages to youfindall.com,
BHO added to IE named 'winshow.dll'. Second variant hijacks to
searchv.com and also redirects mistyped URLs to a porn site, and
reloads the hijack on a reboot, or even sooner.
Cleverness: 5/10, second variant 8/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves lots and
lots of Registry editing, a bit of hosts file editing and
deleting one file.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
O2 - BHO: WinShow module -
{6CC1C918-AE8B-4373-A5B4-28BA1851E39A} - C:\WINDOWS\WINSHOW.DLL
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Second variant CWS.Aff.Winshow.2:
O1 - Hosts file: 209.66.114.130 sitefinder.verisign.com
O2 - BHO: WinShow module -
{6CC1C918-AE8B-4373-A5B4-28BA1851E39A} - C:\Documents And
Settings\username\Application Data\winshow\Winshow.dll
O4 - HKLM\..\Run: [sys] regedit /s C:\WINDOWS\sys.reg
O4 - Global Startup: MSUpdater.exe |
This affiliate variant originally was quite innocent, consisting
only of one Browser Helper Object (BHO) named 'Winshow', with
unknown goal. It was frequently sighted together with other CWS
variants.
CWS.Aff.Winshow.2: The second variant
of this one also used the BHO and filename, but added a hosts
file hijack that redirected mistyped domains/URLs to a porn
site, and reloaded a IE hijack to searchv.com on reboot using a
Registry command file. One file named
MSUpdater.exe was sitting in the 'All Users' startup
folder in the Start Menu, and also reloaded the hijack. Deleting
both files fixed the hijack. It is still unknown what the BHO
actually does.
CWS.Aff.Winshow.3: A third version of
this variant exists, that uses the filename
winlink.dll for the BHO. It hijacks to both searchv.com
and thesten.com. It does not have the additional files the
second version has.
CWS.Aff.Winshow.4: A third version of
this variant exists, that adds an uninstall entry in Add/Remove
Software labelled Winshow, and
auto-updates from a Registry value named
WinShowUpdate.
CWS.Aff.Winshow.5: A third version of
this variant exists, that uses the filename
iefeatsl.dll, hijacks to search-click.com and
auto-updates from a Registry value named
iefeatslUpdate. It also downloads and installs a BHO
named SubmitHook.
CWS.Aff.Winshow.6: A third version of
this variant exists, that uses a random string for its filename
and folder, with the same CLSID as the previous two variants,
{587DBF2D-9145-4c9e-92C2-1F953DA73773}. It also downloads and
installs a BHO named SubmitHook and autoupdates from a Registry
value named Updater.
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CWS.Aff.Madfinder |
Affiliate variant: Madfinder - Kinda like ClientMan
Approx date first sighted:
October 15, 2003
Log reference:
http://forums.spywareinfo.com/index.php?showtopic=14977
Symptoms: IE homepage changed to
madfinder.com, BHO with filename 'BrowserHelper.dll', hijack
returning on reboot, or even sooner.
Cleverness: 5/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves a process
killer and lots of Registry editing.
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
Running processes:
C:\WINDOWS\System32\svc.exe
O1 - BHO: (no name) -
{FCADDC14-BD46-408A-9842-CDBE1C6D37EB} -
C:\WINDOWS\System32\BrowserHelper.dll
O4 - HKCU\..\Run: [svc] C:\WINDOWS\System32\svc.exe |
This variant seems to consist of two files that support each
other. svc.exe runs invisible,
downloads the second BrowserHelper.dll
and installs it as a BHO. However, this BHO file also contains
the first file and probably puts it back when it is deleted. The
variant is always accompanies by a hijack to madfinder.com.
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CWS.Aff.Tooncomics |
Affiliate variant: Tooncomics - Changing the Internet
Approx date first sighted:
September 18, 2003
Log reference:
http://boards.cexx.org/viewtopic.php?p=11617#11617
Symptoms: IE hijacked to tooncomics.com,
targets of hyperlinks on websites changed to porn sites
Cleverness: 9/10
Manual removal difficulty: Involves really
lots of Registry editing, and some hosts file editing
Identifying lines in HijackThis log:
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Search
Page = http://tooncomics.com/main/sp.htm
R0 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,Start
Page = http://tooncomics.com/main/hp.htm
R1 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main,HomeOldSP
= http://66.250.130.194/main/hp.php
O1 - Hosts: 66.40.16.131 livesexlist.com
O1 - Hosts: 66.40.16.131 lanasbigboobs.com
O1 - Hosts: 66.40.16.131 thumbnailpost.com
O1 - Hosts: 66.40.16.131 adult-series.com
O2 - BHO: DNSErr object -
{1E1B2879-88FF-11D2-8D96-D7ACAC95951F} - C:\WINDOWS\DNSErr.dll
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This variant seems to be in the league of
CWS.Vrape, hijacking to porn sites, redirecting other porn
sites to itself, and even using a BHO to change the target of
hyperlinks to porn sites like eZula Toptext does. Some users
even reported being unable to download CWShredder because the
links at the bottom of this article were altered to point to
porn sites. Manual removal is pretty hard, because the
DNSErr.dll file responsible for the
latter part of the hijack has no uninstall built-in like most
dlls. However, flat-out deleting the file has no side effects.
CWS.Aff.Tooncomics.2: There is a second
version of this hijack that Uses the filename
dnse.dll as the BHO, and a second file
ld.exe that is always running, reloading the hijack. In
this version, the IE homepage and search pages are changed to
fastwebfinder.com. A process killer is needed to get rid of
ld.exe.
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Epilogue - The Fix Known As CWShredder |
After reading all
of this, you must be under the impression that a CoolWebSearch
hijack is near impossible to fix since there are so many
variants. Though it is true that the conventional tools like
Ad-Aware, Spybot S&D and HijackThis won't fix all of the
variants, there is one tool that will.
After about the 3rd CWS variant, I realized this particular
spyware company moved faster than any other I'd seen before, and
that the anti-spyware programs wouldn't be able to keep up with
it. So I decided to write a separate program dedicated to
removing CoolWebSearch. It's called
CWShredder and can be downloaded here, in several forms:
This removal tool will be updated for any new variants of
CoolWebSearch, as well as new affiliates that are sighted. It
can remove all of the variants mentioned above.
Note that CWShredder is update very often.
If you have a copy that's more than a week
old, check for an update first before emailing me it's not
working well.
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Epilogue - The Origin |
We are pretty sure
now CoolWebSearch is part of a new strain of trojans that have
recently been identified that all have one thing in common: they
install through the
ByteVerify exploit in the MS Java VM and change the IE
homepage, search page, search bar, etc. Take a look at this
snippet from the description of the
Java.Shinwow trojan:
This is a growing family of trojans that exploits the
ByteCodeVerifier vulnerability in the Microsoft
Virtual Machine to execute unauthorized code on an
affected machine.
The variants of this trojan that we have seen in the
wild have been functionally diverse; the common factor
amongst them has been the use of the ByteVerify exploit to
achieve their goals. Some variants may do little more
than change the user's default Internet Explorer home page
and/or search page via modifications to the registry. |
We strongly recommend you install the patch, available from
this MS security bulletin. If you have Windows XP with
Service Pack 1a, your system has no MS Java VM. Information on
removing the MS Java VM completely and replacing it with the
newer, safer Sun Java VM can be found
here.
An a side note, some of the affiliates (Search-Meta has been
verified) use another Java exploit to install their malware.
It's classified as the
JS.Exception.Exploit, and a patch can be downloaded from
this
MS security bulletin.
In general, it's a good idea to keep your system up-to-date
from
WindowsUpdate!!
It has also been confirmed that 'Index.dat Viewer' changes your
IE search pages to superwebsearch.com, a CWS affiliate page,
after installing it. Uninstalling Index.Dat Viewer will not
restore your search pages.
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Donate / Contact Me |
If you find this page helpful or helps you remove CWS from
your system, we would very much appreciate a donation:

If you have any problems, questions or comments concerning
this document, you can email me if you like.
Merijn,
merijn@spywareinfo.com
However, if you want to send me a flame email or a class
action lawsuit notice, don't bother. I
didn't create Coolwebsearch or install it onto your browser
. If I would have, why would I detail this entire thing
and provide you with a fix for free?
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